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The Alberta government is heavily exposed to energy price volatility as it relies to a great extent on 
revenue derived from the production of oil and natural gas.  Energy prices change substantially and 
unpredictably, causing large and uncertain movements in revenues.  Adjusting to these movements 
typically involves economic, social and political costs.  Alberta government revenues are 
considerably more volatile than the revenues of other provinces, but Alberta’s own-source revenues 
less royalty payments are of similar size and volatility as those of other provinces.  Several methods 
to reduce the volatility of revenues are assessed.  An often-suggested method, tax base 
diversification (for example, use of a retail sales tax), is shown to have a minor effect on overall 
revenue volatility since Alberta’s royalty revenues are such a large share of total own-source 
revenues.  Revenue smoothing using futures and options markets can be expensive, is associated 
with significant political risks, and cannot eliminate all revenue volatility.  The Canadian dollar 
tends to appreciate (depreciate) when energy prices rise (fall), so exchange rate movements have 
smoothed Alberta government revenues, although not by a large amount.  A simulation using 
Alberta data shows that a revenue savings fund could significantly reduce revenue volatility.  This 
type of fund leads to greater revenue stability because the revenue it contributes to the budget in any 
particular year is based on revenues averaged over prior years.  Revenue uncertainty is also reduced 
with a savings fund since future revenue depends on known past contributions. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Oil and natural gas prices often change rapidly, substantially and unpredictably.  The 
Alberta government is heavily exposed to energy price volatility as it relies to a large extent on 
revenue derived from the production of oil and natural gas.  For Alberta, as with the governments of 
other oil producing jurisdictions, dealing with large revenue movements typically involves 
economic, social and political costs.  Rapid declines in energy revenues may lead to cuts in 
expenditures that are difficult to accomplish quickly and efficiently.  Revenue volatility that drives 
government expenditures can also cause fiscal policy to be pro-cyclical, thus magnifying 
movements in economic activity.   
This paper provides an analysis of the volatility of Alberta government revenues and, in so 
doing, considers the following questions.  Is revenue volatility a problem?  Are Alberta government 
revenues more volatile than the revenues of other provinces?  What are the principal causes of 
Alberta government revenue volatility?  Can revenue volatility be reduced through tax base 
diversification or hedging in futures and options markets?  What impact do exchange rate 
movements have on revenue volatility?  Could a revenue savings fund reduce volatility?  These 
questions are addressed both in general terms and with explicit reference to the case of Alberta.
1
Data indicate that Alberta government revenues are considerably more volatile than the 
revenues of other provinces, but own-source revenues less royalty payments are of similar size and 
volatility as those of other provinces.  One method proposed to reduce the volatility of revenues, tax 
base diversification (for example, use of a retail sales tax), is shown to have a relatively minor effect 
on overall revenue volatility since Alberta’s royalty revenues are such a large share of own-source 
revenues.  Revenue smoothing using futures and options markets can be expensive, is associated 
with significant political risks, and cannot eliminate all revenue volatility.  The Canadian dollar 
tends to appreciate (depreciate) when energy prices rise (fall), so exchange rate movements have 
smoothed Alberta government revenues, although not by a large amount.  A simulation using 
Alberta data shows that a revenue savings fund could significantly reduce revenue volatility.  This 
type of fund leads to greater revenue stability because the revenue it contributes to the budget in any 
particular year is based on revenues averaged over prior years and because a large proportion of the 
most volatile revenues, royalties, are deposited in the fund.  Revenue uncertainty is also reduced 




2.  Is revenue volatility a problem? 
   
Government revenue volatility may have important negative consequences.  For example, 
revenue volatility increases uncertainty for both the public and private sectors.  A government may 
wish to provide infrastructure and social services that reflect the long run permanent component of 
income, but it is difficult to set the correct level of spending when it is not clear what part of volatile 
revenue changes is permanent and what part is temporary.  The volatility of revenues also creates 
uncertainty for the private sector since it is more difficult to predict future government tax and 
spending policies, both of which may have important consequences for private sector profits and 
investment decisions.  Using data for a wide variety of countries, government revenue and 
                                                 
1 Given the emphasis on revenue volatility, the important issues of expenditure volatility and intergenerational equity 
and fiscal sustainability are only addressed to the extent that they relate to revenue volatility.  2 
 
expenditure volatility has been shown to lead to slower economic growth (Barnett and Ossowski, 
2002; Afonso and Furceri, 2008; Sturm et al, 2009).       
  Another major consequence of revenue volatility is that, in many jurisdictions, volatile 
revenues induce volatile movements in government expenditures.  When revenues expand during a 
boom, expenditures tend to grow rapidly and, when revenues fall, expenditures are cut (although 
often more slowly than expenditures initially rose).  That is, revenue volatility may cause 
governments to pursue stop-go pro-cyclical fiscal policies (Sturm et al., 2009).  These pro-cyclical 
policies accentuate the business cycle so that, rather than acting to reduce volatility, the government 
becomes a driving force magnifying economic fluctuations.  The volatility of economic activity and 
the volatile provision of government services will reduce individual welfare if consumers are risk 
averse and, thereby, prefer less volatile income and consumption.
2  Further, given that there are real 
costs of moving resources between expanding and contracting sectors, it is especially important for 
government policy to help stabilize the economy, rather than to aggravate economic volatility.
3
  Government spending increases during revenue booms may increase the costs of goods 
purchased by the government.  There is some indication that increases in government revenues are 
correlated with upward pressure on prices.  In Alberta, the prices of current goods and services 
purchased by government rose at an average annual rate of 4.1 percent between 2002 and 2008, 
while they rose by only 2.6 percent in British Columbia and 3.3 percent in Ontario.  During this 
same period, real per capita revenues were rising more than twice as fast in Alberta than in either 
Ontario or British Columbia.
   
4
Large increases in government revenues during booms may lead governments to spend on 
services and investment projects that have relatively low returns.  The rapid expansion of programs 
and capital spending during revenue booms may also stretch the capacity of the government to 
provide services and monitor spending, leading to waste, inefficiency and the unproductive use of 
government funds (Barnett and Ossowski, 2002).  Further, during a revenue collapse, it is difficult 
to cut spending efficiently; that is, to first cut projects and services with the lowest return.  Large 
spending cuts precipitated by a fall in revenues may also damage the morale and capacity of the 
public sector, leading to the more inefficient provision of public services.   
  Further, during booms, pro-cyclical government spending competes 
with private sector spending, which can raise wages and other input costs, thereby increasing 
private-sector costs.      
To the extent that it is easier politically to raise government spending than to reduce 
spending, there may be a greater tendency to expand spending in revenue booms than to contract 
spending in busts.  Thus, revenue volatility may result in an expansion of the size of government 
and, potentially, the implementation of an unsustainable fiscal plan that will necessitate even greater 
expenditure cuts in the future.     
 
 
                                                 
2 The magnitude of the welfare loss associated with consumption volatility is the subject of much debate.  For example, 
Borensztein et al (2009) suggests that the magnitude of the loss from this type of volatility may not be that large, while 
Morduch (1995) argues that it can be quite large. 
3 These costs may explain why countries with highly volatile terms of trade, and, in particular, oil producers, tend to 
have slower growth rates (Blattman, Hwang and Williamson, 2007; van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009; Frankel, 2010). 
4 Using data for 1981 to 2007, the log of real per capita own-source revenues is found to be a significant determinant of 
the ratio of the government current expenditure price index to the CPI for both Alberta and British Columbia (although 
not for Saskatchewan or Ontario).  This is another indication that revenue growth may increase the prices of government 
purchased goods. 3 
 




Alberta government own-source revenues are quite volatile relative to the revenues of the 
other provinces, as can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, where own-source revenue is total revenue less 
transfers from other levels of government.
6
  Another method of comparing the relative volatility of revenues is to examine the extent to 
which revenues deviate from trend.  These deviations can be measured using the coefficient of 
variation – the normalized standard deviation.
  Over the period 1982-2007, the year-to-year change in 
the real per capita own-source revenues of Alberta exceeded 10 percent nine times (that is, in 35 
percent of the years).  In comparison, this magnitude of a revenue change occurred on only six 
occasions in Saskatchewan, only once in British Columbia and not at all in Ontario. 
7  This measure can be interpreted as the percentage 
of the average value of a variable, government revenues in this case, represented by one standard 
deviation of the differences of the variable from trend.
8  For 1981 to 2007, the coefficient of 
variation for Alberta government real per capita own-source revenues is 15.4.  In other words, if the 
deviations of revenues from trend have a normal distribution, there is a 68 percent probability that 
revenues fall in a band around the average value of own-source revenues that is equivalent in 
magnitude to 30.8 percent of the average (while the probability that they fall outside this band is 32 
percent).  The coefficients of variation associated with the real per capita own-source revenues of 
British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Ontario are 7.8, 6.5 and 6.2 respectively (Table 1).
9  Thus, 
Alberta’s own-source revenues are more than twice as variable, relative to their average, as the 





                                                 
5 Sources and definitions for the data used in the text, figures and tables are given in the Data Appendix. 
6 Revenue volatility depends on both movements in tax bases and changes in tax rates.  Due to difficulties with 
obtaining data on different tax rates through time, for the most part, the analysis focuses on revenue volatility and does 
not distinguish whether this volatility is due to tax base or tax rate volatility.   
7 To measure the volatility of revenues, the coefficient of variation is calculated using the following procedure.  The 
natural log of revenues is regressed on a trend; the predicted values in levels are found by taking the exponential of the 
predicted values from this regression; a series of residuals is calculated by subtracting the predicted values in levels 
from the corresponding observation in the revenues data; and the coefficient of variation is calculated as the ratio 
(multiplied by 100) of the standard deviation of these residuals to the average value of revenues.  This method is similar 
to that used in Carroll (2009). 
8 This means that the standard deviation is measured in the same units as revenues.  For example, if the coefficient of 
variation is 10, and the average value of revenues is $1000, the coefficient of variation implies that a one standard 
deviation band around the average ranges from $900 to $1100.  One shortcoming of this method is that two variables 
with the same coefficient of variation can represent one standard deviation bands that differ significantly in dollar terms 
if their mean values differ.  Boresztein et al (2009) use an alternative measure of volatility – the standard deviation of 
the residuals from a regression of the natural log of revenues on a trend.  This is easier to compute and easier to 
compare across variables of different magnitudes because the average level and units of measurement are irrelevant.  
However, since this measure is the standard deviation of a log, it is difficult to relate to the units (dollars) in which 
revenues are measured.  Nevertheless, the two methods generate the same conclusions and relative comparisons. 
9 Total real per capita revenues include transfers from other levels of government.  Since the coefficients of variation are 
smaller for total revenues, relative to those for own-source revenues, federal transfers have, on average over the 1981-
2007 period, reduced the volatility of revenues (although this has not been the case in every sub-period).  
10 In real per capita dollar terms, the difference in volatility is even larger since Alberta’s own-source revenues are at 
least 20 percent higher on average than the revenues of the other provinces.  For example, the dollar equivalent of the 
one standard deviation band around average real per capita own-source revenues for Alberta is $2188, while it is only 
$906 for British Columbia.  4 
 
4.  What are the causes of Alberta revenue volatility? 
 
  The greater variability of Alberta government revenues is driven principally by the highly 
volatile energy sector royalty component of revenues as well as, to a much smaller extent, by the 
volatility of corporate profits (Figure 3 and Table 2).  Volatility in these revenue sources, in turn, is 
driven mainly by movements in energy prices. 
 
4.1  The magnitude and volatility of royalty revenues in Alberta   
 
As shown in Table 3, for Alberta, the simple correlation between the growth rate 
(percentage change) of real per capita total own-source revenues and the growth rate of royalty 
revenues is .90 over the period from 1982 to 2007.  The growth rate of corporate tax revenues had 
the next highest correlation with own-source revenues (.71).  In contrast, for personal income taxes, 
the second largest tax source in Alberta, the correlation coefficient with own-source revenues is 
only .42.  In the other provinces, own-source revenues are less correlated with royalties and, in 
general, more correlated with personal income tax revenues.           
The large impact of royalty volatility on own-source revenue volatility arises both because 
royalty revenues are volatile and because royalty revenues are the largest single component of own-
source revenues.  On average, from 1981-2007, royalty revenues accounted for 31 percent of real 
per capita own-source revenues.  The next largest revenue type, direct taxes on persons, accounted 
for only 20.5 percent.  The share of royalty revenues in own-source revenues is large relative to 
other provinces (Table 4).  Royalties made up only 14.6 percent of Saskatchewan government own-
source revenues over the 1981 to 2007 period and were Saskatchewan’s third largest revenue source 
(after direct taxes on persons and the retail sales tax).  In British Columbia, royalties comprised only 
10.3 percent of revenues (and were the fourth largest revenue type) while, in Ontario, royalties 
made up an insignificant component of revenues.   
Not only are royalties by far the largest component of government revenues in Alberta, they 
are also the most variable.  The coefficient of variation associated with royalty revenues in Alberta 
over the period 1981-2007 is 43.6 (Table 2).
11
The volatility of royalty revenues is due primarily to variation in energy prices, particularly 
the price of natural gas as natural gas accounted for 45 percent of total royalty payments from 1981-
2009 and 54 percent over the past five years (Table 5).  Over the 1982-2007 period, the simple 
correlation coefficient between the growth rate of real per capita royalty revenues and the growth 
rates of the real Canadian dollar prices of natural gas and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) petroleum 
were .87 and .70, respectively (Table 6).  Given the large share of royalties in revenues, changes in 
these prices drive changes in total real per capita own-source revenues – the correlations between 
the growth rates of real per capita own-source revenues and real Canadian dollar natural gas and 
petroleum prices are .68 and .72.  In comparison, the correlations between changes in real per capita 
  A one standard deviation band around the average 
value of real per capita royalty revenues ranges from $1245 to $3169.  The magnitude of this band, 
$1924, is equivalent to 27 percent of average own-source revenues.  In comparison, direct taxes on 
corporations, the second most variable component of revenues, with a coefficient of variation of 
24.2, has a one standard deviation band of only $284.     
                                                 
11 This level of variability is not unique to Alberta.  Borensztein et al (2009) find that the standard deviation of de-
trended commodity exports for 21 major petroleum exporters is .34, implying export revenue volatility of similar 
magnitude to the variability of Alberta’s royalty revenues. 5 
 
own-source revenues less royalty revenues and changes in real natural gas and petroleum prices are 
only .13 and .53, respectively.   
As another indication of the importance of energy price variation to royalty revenue 
variation, the growth rate of real per capita royalties was regressed on the change in the real natural 
gas price, lagged royalties and the lagged natural gas price.  This regression explains 78 percent of 
the variation in the growth rate of royalties and all the coefficients in the regression are statistically 
significant.  In contrast, a comparable regression explains only 17 percent of the variation in own-
source revenues less royalties, and the two natural gas price variables in this regression are not 
statistically significant. 
Given the close relationship between royalty revenues and energy prices, it is not surprising 
that royalty revenues are quite volatile since energy prices are also volatile (Table 2).  The 
coefficients of variation over the period 1981 to 2007 of the real Canadian dollar prices of natural 
gas and WTI petroleum are 42.0 and 39.4, respectively.  That is, the difference between the upper 
and lower bounds of a one standard deviation band around the averages of these prices is equivalent 
in magnitude to approximately 80 percent of the average price.  These coefficients of variation are 
of similar magnitude to those of royalty revenues.  The coefficients of variation of other tax bases 
tend to be much smaller.  For example, the coefficient of variation of personal income, the tax base 
for the personal income tax, is just 4.8 (Table 2). 
 
4.2  The volatility of non-royalty revenues   
 
After royalties, corporate tax revenues are the most volatile revenue type in Alberta (Table 
2).  The coefficient of variation of real per capita Alberta corporate tax revenues for the period 1981 
to 2007 is 24.2, which is similar to the volatility of corporate tax revenues in both Saskatchewan 
and Ontario.  Although volatile, corporate tax revenues are not expected to be a large driver of 
overall revenue volatility because these revenues accounted for only 8.3 percent of own-source 
revenues during 1981-2007, one quarter of the share of the more volatile royalty component of 
revenues.  In fact, the real per capita dollar value of the one standard deviation band around average 
corporate tax revenues was almost identical to that for the much less volatile revenues from direct 
taxes on persons because personal income taxes contributed a much larger share of total revenues 
on average (20.5 percent of own-source revenues).  Nevertheless, both royalty revenues and 
corporate tax revenues are more highly correlated with energy prices than are personal income tax 
revenues and, thus, movements in energy prices may cause synchronized movements in both types 
of tax revenues, accentuating the volatility of total revenues (Table 6). 
A comparison of the volatility of non-royalty own-source revenues in Alberta with the non-
royalty own-source revenues in other provinces illustrates the importance of the role played by the 
volatility of royalty payments in generating Alberta government revenue volatility.  While the 
coefficient of variation of Alberta’s real per capita own-source revenues for the period 1981 to 2007 
is 15.4, the coefficient of variation of own-source revenues less royalties is only 6.7 (Table 1).  This 
is only slightly higher than the corresponding coefficient of variation for Ontario (6.2) and lower 
than the coefficients of variation for British Columbia (8.1) and Saskatchewan (9.2).  As can be 
seen from Figure 4, the pattern of the differences of own-source revenues minus royalties from 
trend for Alberta is also similar to the pattern for the other three provinces.    
  Not only do Alberta non-royalty own-source revenues have a similar degree of volatility as 
those of Saskatchewan, British Columbia and Ontario, they are also of a similar size in real per 
capita terms, as shown in Figure 5.  Alberta’s non-royalty real per capita own-source revenues 6 
 
averaged $4899 over the 1981 to 2007 period, while the non-royalty own-source revenues of 
Saskatchewan, British Columbia and Ontario averaged $4817, $5211 and $4684, respectively 
(Table 1).  Hence, Alberta’s non-royalty own-source revenues are, on average, similar in terms of 
volatility and magnitude to the revenues of the other provinces.
12
   
 
4.3  Alberta revenue volatility and the persistence of revenue changes 
   
  Alberta revenues have been volatile, and much of this volatility has been driven by 
persistent movements away from trend.  As Figure 2 shows, real per capita own-source revenues 
were above trend from 1981-85, below trend from 1986 through 1999, above trend in 2000 and 
2001, below in 2002, and above trend from 2003 through 2007.  The longer term movements in 
revenues away from trend are driven by movements in royalties, as own-source revenues minus 
royalties move above and below trend twice as often as total own-source revenues (Figure 4).  The 
persistence of revenue movements above and below trend are important because they imply that 
downturns in revenues may not be short lived, while upturns may seem permanent and, thereby, 
may induce too great an increase in spending.     
Given the dependence of royalties on energy prices, the long movements in own-source 
revenues away from trend can be attributed to persistent movements in energy prices.  Considerable 
evidence suggests that oil prices follow a process similar to a random walk (Hamilton, 2008).
13  
This has two important implications for the volatility of revenues.  First, movements in revenues 
away from trend can be quite persistent as there are no forces causing oil prices to return to some 
constant equilibrium value.  Second, if oil prices follow a random walk, the best forecast of the oil 
price in any future period is the current oil price.  Nevertheless, this forecast is likely to be a very 
poor forecast since it has a very high standard error due to the high variance of oil prices.
14
 
  This 
means that royalty revenues, the component of revenues that is both most closely related to oil 
prices and the driver of the volatility in total revenues, will be extremely difficult to forecast and 
will have no tendency to converge quickly to some stable average value.  
 
5.  What can be done to reduce revenue volatility? 
 
Alberta government revenue volatility is primarily driven by royalty revenue volatility and 
this, in turn, is driven by energy price volatility.  Energy prices are determined in world or North 
American markets and are effectively out of the control of the Alberta government.  To reduce 
revenue volatility it is necessary to reduce the share of royalty revenues in overall revenues, say by 
tax base “diversification,” or to reduce the volatility of royalty revenues, say by hedging or by 
smoothing royalty revenues through time.   
                                                 
12 This comparison does not account for the different approaches used to levy education taxes in the four provinces. 
13 The data used in this study are consistent with real oil and natural gas prices following a random walk.  A regression 
of the log of the real Canadian dollar WTI petroleum price on its lag using data for 1982-2008 yields a coefficient of .8, 
while a similar regression for the real Canadian dollar natural gas price yields a coefficient on the lag of .91.  Both 
coefficients are not significantly different from one, so a random walk with drift cannot be rejected. 
14 Hamilton (2008) estimates that, with an oil price in 2008Q1 of US$115, the 95% confidence interval for 2008Q2 was 
$85-$156.  However, as noted by Hamilton (2008): “To predict the price of oil one quarter, one year, or one decade 
ahead, it is not at all naive to offer as a forecast whatever the price currently happens to be.”  Engel and Valdes (2000) 
test a large number of models of oil price forecasts and find that a simple random walk, where the forecast of the future 
price is the current price, performs best.   7 
 
5.1  Tax base diversification 
 
5.1.1  Methods to reduce the share of revenues from the energy sector 
 
One method to reduce revenue volatility is to decrease the dependence of revenues on the 
more volatile energy-related tax bases through tax base diversification.  Tax base diversification is 
one motivation for suggestions that the government implement policies to diversify the economy 
away from energy-related activity.  This method of tax base diversification has three significant 
shortcomings.  First, this approach may take a long time to yield results and, second, is likely to be 
inefficient since it runs counter to Alberta’s comparative advantage – the extraction of energy 
resources.
15
Another way to reduce the dependence of total revenues on the energy sector is to collect 
less revenue from the more volatile energy-related tax bases – energy sector production (royalties) 
and corporate profits.  For example, the Alberta government could have set royalty rates and 
corporate tax rates at levels that would have collected 25 percent less revenue than was actually 
collected from these sources over the 1981 to 2007 period.  Assuming no change in other tax 
revenues, the lower tax rates would have caused own-source revenue volatility to be just 14 percent 
smaller – the coefficient of variation would decline from 15.4 to 13.2.  On the other hand, average 
own-source revenues would fall by just under 10 percent.  Thus, even with a significant revenue 
sacrifice, revenue volatility would remain high because royalties would continue to comprise a large 
proportion of total own-source revenues.  More importantly, it may be undesirable to reduce 
royalties on the grounds of economic efficiency since, to the extent that royalties are taxes on rents, 
they are likely to be less distortionary than taxes on other tax bases.  In addition, a cut in royalty 
rates would reduce the return to the owners of the resource, the residents of Alberta. 
  The third major shortcoming is that government-encouraged economic diversification 
relies on the government’s ability to pick successful non-energy related industries, but there is little 
evidence that governments can do this more effectively than the private sector. 
 
5.1.2  A sales tax 
 
Another often-mentioned method of reducing revenue volatility through tax diversification 
is to place greater emphasis on the retail sales tax since this tax base has been relatively under-
exploited in Alberta (Table 4).
16  Including taxes on alcohol and tobacco, Saskatchewan collected 
$900 per capita in retail sales taxes on average from 1981-2007 (in constant 2002 dollars), Ontario 
collected $1063 and British Columbia collected $1043.  In contrast, Alberta collected $141.
17
                                                 
15 These first two points are made by Arrau and Claessens (1992) in their study of methods of revenue stabilization for 
commodity exporters. 
  Thus, 
there seems ample opportunity for Alberta to significantly raise revenues through the imposition of 
a retail sales tax.  Further, since the sales tax base tends to be relatively stable, greater reliance on a 
sales tax would reduce revenue volatility.  For the 1981 to 2007 period, the coefficients of variation 
of two possible definitions of the retail sales tax base – real per capita expenditure on consumer 
goods and real per capita final demand – were just 2.7 and 8.3, respectively.  As shown in Table 2, 
these tax bases are much less volatile than energy prices.  Sales tax revenues have also proved to be 
16 In a recent Globe & Mail column, DeCloet (2010) states that a provincial sales tax in Alberta would be “an 
economically-sensible idea”. 
17 US states also rely on the sales tax to a much greater extent than does Alberta.  Median state sales tax revenue 
accounts for about 30 percent of total state revenues (Felix, 2008). 8 
 
quite stable in other provinces.  The coefficient of variation of real per capita sales tax revenue is 
only 5 for British Columbia, and approximately 9 for both Saskatchewan and Ontario (Table 7). 
A simple example illustrates the potential impact on Alberta revenue volatility of greater 
reliance on a sales tax.  In this example, the change in revenue volatility is calculated when a 
volatile tax source – Alberta’s corporate tax – is replaced with a more stable revenue source of 
almost equal magnitude – the real per capita retail sales tax revenues of British Columbia – for each 
year from 1981 to 2007.
18
 
  Holding everything else constant, the adoption of a sales tax yielding per 
capita revenues identical to those collected by British Columbia, along with the elimination of the 
volatile corporate profits tax, causes the coefficient of variation of Alberta own-source revenues to 
fall by only 11.5 percent (from 15.4 to 13.6).  Thus, even the complete replacement of volatile 
corporate tax revenues with much more stable sales tax revenues, yields a relatively small drop in 
the volatility of own-source revenues.  The reason for this small change in volatility is that sales tax 
revenues are fairly small compared to royalties and, thus, the volatility of revenues would continue 
to be driven by royalties. 
5.1.3  Other sources of revenue 
 
Tax revenues could also be diversified by exploiting revenue sources other than the sales 
tax.  Personal income tax revenues tend to be relatively stable and are only weakly correlated with 
royalties and energy prices (Tables 2 and 6).
19
Income from interest and other investment income was, on average over the 1981-2007 
period, the third largest component of Alberta own-source revenue.  However, the real per capita 
contribution of this revenue source to total revenues has been falling over time, so these revenues 
are now a much less important component of total revenues than in the 1980s.
  On the other hand, in 2007, real per capita direct 
taxes on persons were already higher in Alberta than in British Columbia and Saskatchewan, 
although lower than in Ontario (and a similar comparison holds, on average, for the whole 1981-
2007 period as shown in Figure 3).  Thus, there may be little room to increase revenue from this 
source, particularly without significantly increasing the level of tax-induced distortions. 
20
                                                 
18 To make the level of revenues similar in the two cases, British Columbia’s actual real per capita retail sales tax 
revenues were used to replace Alberta’s small real per capita retail sales tax revenues as well as its corporate tax 
revenues. Alberta’s real per capita own-source revenues averaged $7419 over the 1981-2007 period for the case 
incorporating the BC sales tax revenues as opposed to the actual value of $7105. 
  Further, given the 
current low level of real returns, it seems likely that this source of government income will continue 
to make a relatively small contribution to revenue.  A significant advantage of revenue from interest 
and other investment income is that it is negatively correlated with both the level and growth rate of 
corporate tax revenue and is much less strongly correlated with royalties than is corporate tax 
revenue (Table 6).  These revenues are also less volatile than either royalty revenues or corporate 
tax revenues (Table 2).  Nevertheless, the potential for placing more emphasis on this type of 
revenue in the short run is limited because investment income depends on the level of past 
government saving.  
19 If we regress the growth rate of real per capita wages and salaries and other labour income on the growth rate of the 
real Canadian dollar price of natural gas as well as the natural logs of the lagged values of wages and the natural gas 
price, the two natural gas price variables are insignificant and the R
2 is only .16.  A similar result is found for real per 
capita personal income.  In contrast, if a comparable equation is estimated with real per capita corporate profits as the 
dependent variable, the natural gas price variables are both significant and the R
2 is .51.  
20 In 1981-1985, revenues from interest and other investment income accounted for 22.4 percent of own-source 
revenues, but this share had fallen to only 9.8 percent, on average, during 2003-2007. 9 
 
Some of the smaller provincial tax bases are quite stable.  For example, gasoline taxes have 
a coefficient of variation of only 3.2 over the 1994-2007 period, while the coefficient of variation 
for gambling revenues is 6.3.  Payroll taxes have been a stable source of revenues in Ontario (with a 
coefficient of variation of only 2.1 over the 1992-2007 period)
21 and health care premiums were a 
stable source of revenues for Alberta.  Nevertheless, greater use of these taxes to reduce overall 
revenue volatility is likely to have only a minor impact and, in some cases, greater use of these 
taxes would have serious shortcomings.  First, Alberta already exploits gambling revenues to a 
greater extent than the other provinces, so it is unclear whether there is much opportunity for further 
diversification into this tax base (particularly with competition from internet gambling).
22
In summary, tax base diversification is likely to have a relatively minor effect on Alberta 
revenue volatility because royalty revenues are large and volatile relative to the alternatives.  Tax 
base diversification can only reduce revenue volatility if the revenues collected from the unstable 
energy and corporate tax bases are significantly reduced as a proportion of total revenues.  This 
would entail a significant increase in taxes from other sources and, thus, in the overall tax burden, 
or a significant decrease in the revenues collected from royalties and corporate taxes. 
  There 
may also be little room for further expansion of alcohol and tobacco taxes and greater reliance on 
property tax revenues could crowd out local government tax revenues.  Second, while the gasoline 
tax base has been exploited less in Alberta than in other provinces – per capita real gasoline tax 
revenues in 2007 were $185 in Alberta, but were $350 in Saskatchewan, $215 in Ontario, and $250 
in BC – the relatively small size of this revenue source in other provinces suggests that expansion is 
likely to be limited.  Third, the introduction of a payroll tax (as used by Ontario) would raise the 
cost of labour and, potentially, have a negative impact on employment and other tax revenues.  
Finally, given the large share of royalty revenues in total revenues, and the magnitude of royalty 
volatility, none of the prospective tax bases are large enough and have enough room for further 
expansion to have an appreciable effect on overall revenue volatility. This is not to suggest that 
greater use of these tax bases would not have an impact on the level of revenues collected, just not 
on the volatility of revenues
 .    
 
5.2  Revenue volatility and stabilization from exchange rate movements 
 
Government expenditures (the wages of provincial government workers, for example) are 
mostly denominated in Canadian dollars, so the volatility of revenues in Canadian dollars is what 
matters to the government.  The volatility of energy-related revenues in Canadian dollars depends 
on both the volatility of US dollar denominated energy prices and the volatility of the exchange rate.  
Given this link between exchange rate movements and revenue volatility, in order to understand 
revenue volatility, it is necessary to determine how exchange rate volatility affects the volatility of 
government revenues.   
One way to assess the impact of the exchange rate on government revenues is to note that, 
since energy prices are denominated in US dollars, the Alberta government’s royalty stream is 
similar to the returns from an investment in a US dollar denominated asset.  For an investor in a 
foreign currency denominated asset, Campbell, Medeiros and Viceira (2010) show that optimal 
investment risk management depends on the extent to which the exchange rate and the value of the 
                                                 
21 Ontario collects approximately $300 per capita in payroll taxes (in 2002 constant dollars). 
22 During 2007, in real per capita terms, Alberta collected $434 in gaming profits (in 2002 constant dollars) while 
British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Ontario collected $223, $280 and $105, respectively. 10 
 
foreign asset are correlated.  As an example, they observe that the Canadian dollar tends to 
appreciate relative to the US dollar when the US stock market rises in value.  This movement in the 
Canadian dollar when US equity prices change acts to smooth Canadian dollar denominated returns 
from US equity investments.  Thus, there is less need for a Canadian investor holding US assets to 
hedge against currency risk.  Indeed, full currency hedging would increase a Canadian investor’s 
portfolio risk by eliminating the smoothing function of the exchange rate. 
As in the US equity example of Campbell, Medeiros and Viceira (2010), if the Canadian 
dollar rises (falls) in value with increases (decreases) in the US dollar price of oil, movements in the 
exchange rate would stabilize the Canadian dollar value of oil revenues.  Evidence suggests that 
there exists this type of positive relationship between the Canadian dollar and energy prices, so the 
exchange rate works as a natural hedge with respect to oil price movements (Frankel, 2010).
23
Another reason to expect the Canadian dollar to appreciate following a rise in the price of oil 
is the Bank of Canada’s inflation targeting policy.  Ragan (2005) argues that inflation targeting 
means that the Bank will tighten monetary policy following a rise in commodity prices, causing an 
appreciation of the Canadian dollar.  As Ragan notes, in this way inflation targeting will tend to 
accentuate the positive oil price-Canadian dollar correlation, thus increasing the smoothing effect of 
exchange rate movements on Canadian dollar denominated energy revenues
  
Bayoumi and Mühleisen (2006) find that the value of the Canadian dollar rises with energy prices 
and, commensurately, Taylor (2008) and Lipsky (2008) note that the value of the US dollar is 
negatively correlated with the oil price.  Chen and Rogoff (2003) find positive co-variation between 
the exchange rate and the price of export commodities, such as oil, using data for Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand, as do Chen, Rogoff, and Rossi (2008) who consider the same three countries plus 
Chile and South Africa.  Further, evidence of such “commodity currencies” is presented by Cashin, 
Céspedes, Sahay (2004) using a sample of 58 countries, including five industrial countries 
(Australia, Canada, Iceland, Norway and New Zealand.)   
24
The simple correlation coefficients reported in Table 6, which imply that a rise in energy 
prices leads to an appreciation of the Canadian dollar (a fall in the Canadian dollar price of a US 
dollar), are consistent with the evidence presented in the studies cited above.  Therefore, movements 
in the Canadian dollar act to smooth movements in Canadian dollar denominated energy revenues.  
This is confirmed by the coefficients of variation presented in Table 2.  These show that the real 
Canadian dollar prices of oil and natural gas are less variable than the US dollar prices (the 
coefficients of variation in Canadian dollars are smaller than those for the US dollar prices).  This 
difference is greater for the price of oil, where the coefficient of variation for the real price of oil in 
US dollars is 46.9, while it is only 39.4 for the Canadian dollar price, a 16 percent difference.
 
25
Although the coefficients of variation given in Table 2 indicate that exchange rate 
movements have reduced Canadian dollar oil and gas price volatility, the volatility of both prices in 
Canadian dollars is still quite high.  Thus, the role of exchange rate movements in reducing revenue 
volatility is relatively small.  Since the exchange rate moves for many reasons other than changes in 
energy prices, movements in the exchange rate only partly offset movements in US dollar 
 
                                                 
23 The existence of this type of relationship seems reasonable since a rise in world demand for a major commodity 
export raises demand for the currency of the exporting country, causing the currency to appreciate in value. 
24 An alternative monetary policy strategy, proposed by Jeffrey Frankel (2005), is for oil exporters to target the export 
price index (rather than CPI inflation).  This policy would also cause a currency appreciation following an oil price rise.   
25 The coefficient of variation for natural gas falls by only 9 percent.  This smaller effect is not unexpected as the 
correlation between the Canadian dollar and natural gas prices tends to be smaller than that between the dollar and oil 
prices. 11 
 
denominated energy prices.  This is confirmed by the estimates in Bayoumi and Mühleisen (2006), 
obtained using quarterly data for the period from 1972-2005, which indicate that a 1 percent 
increase in energy prices leads only to a contemporaneous .37 percent increase in the value of the 
Canadian dollar relative to the US dollar.  In other words, the exchange rate does not move by 
enough to completely counteract the effect of US dollar denominated energy price movements on 
Canadian dollar denominated prices.  This suggests that other methods of hedging may be necessary 
if revenue volatility is to be reduced.
26
 
   
5.3  Smoothing with futures and options 
 
  Many different types of financial market instruments exist to reduce revenue uncertainty and 
volatility. Of these, the two most commonly used involve pre-selling commodities in futures 
markets and the purchase of put options – assets which give the option, but not the obligation, to 
sell a commodity at a stated price during a fixed period of time.
27
 
  For example, in late 1990 and 
early 1991, the Mexican government purchased put options with a strike price of US$17 per barrel 
in order to protect its oil-related revenues from a price decline (Larson and Varangis, 1996).  
Similarly, Texas set up a hedging program that operated on a regular basis from 1992-2000 to 
ensure that declines in oil prices did not lead to an overall budget deficit for the two-year duration 
of each budget period (Swidler, Buttimer and Shaw, 1999).   
5.3.1 Futures markets 
 
5.3.1.1  Selling in-kind oil royalty payments in futures markets 
 
In Alberta, conventional crude oil royalties are paid in-kind.
28
While futures markets can reduce revenue uncertainty, these markets have several 
shortcomings.  The majority of transactions in futures markets involve relatively short-term 
contracts (one or two months), but to have a significant impact on uncertainty and the volatility of 
revenues, the government would need to enter into futures contracts that cover at least the current 
budget year.  Futures markets may not be very liquid at longer maturities, which may make the sale 
of these contracts more difficult and more costly (Larson, Varangis and Yabuki, 1998; Domanski 
and Heath, 2007; Borensztein et al, 2009).  Further, the price locked in by futures contracts will 
  By contracting to sell this oil 
at a fixed price on the date in the future when the in-kind royalty will be paid, it is possible to 
eliminate uncertainty with respect to the revenues that will be received from these royalty payments.  
For example, the revenues from the in-kind royalty payments to be received during a fiscal year 
could be made certain by selling twelve futures contracts at the beginning of the fiscal year equal to 
the quantities of oil that are expected to be delivered in each month of the year. 
                                                 
26 The role of the exchange rate as a natural hedge appears to be misunderstood.  Governments often point out that an 
appreciation of the Canadian dollar reduces Canadian dollar revenues, but rarely acknowledge the positive contribution 
to the smoothing of Canadian dollar denominated revenues from a depreciation of the currency when energy prices fall. 
27 There are many other types of hedging contracts and hedging methods.  One strategy is to invest in assets that have 
returns that are negatively correlated with energy prices.  Caballero and Cowan (2007) suggest using options and futures 
markets to do this by shorting instruments such as the VIX or other assets whose returns are correlated with the demand 
for oil.   
28 Alberta “accepts delivery of the Crown’s royalty share of crude oil and sells it at current market value.  Unlike other 
energy commodities, conventional crude oil royalties are paid with ‘in-kind’ product” (Alberta, Department of Energy, 
Annual Report 2007-08, p 7). 12 
 
vary from year to year since the contracts are sold in different years.  Thus, while futures contracts 
can make revenues more certain over short periods, they cannot eliminate the volatility of revenues 
over the long term.  Nevertheless, the use of futures contracts may still reduce the level of volatility 
since futures prices appear to be less volatile than spot prices.
29
Exchange traded oil futures contracts are denominated in US dollars, so the sale of a futures 
contract would fix revenues in US dollars.  To eliminate the uncertainty associated with the 
Canadian dollar value of these contracts, it would be necessary to enter a second contract to sell US 
dollars forward, thereby adding to hedging costs.   
   
Futures contracts involve standardized commodities, such as WTI petroleum, but Alberta’s 
oil is heavier and generally sells for less, with the differential between the WTI price and the price 
of Alberta oil varying over time.
30
A major shortcoming of the use of futures contracts to reduce Alberta government revenue 
volatility is that the sale of futures contracts is only practical for royalties that are received in-kind, 
a small part of total royalty revenues (Table 5).
  This means that there is risk that the spread between the price of 
the WTI oil specified in the contract and the price of the oil produced in Alberta and delivered in-
kind will change during the life of the contract, causing revenues to be different than expected.     
31
 
  The elimination of all variability in royalties from 
conventional oil would have little impact on overall royalty variability since conventional oil 
accounted for only 12.8 percent of total non-renewable resource revenues in 2005-09, about 4 
percent of total own-source revenues (Table 5).  
5.3.1.2  The cost of transactions in futures markets 
 
The direct transactions cost associated with selling futures contracts is relatively small — 
Alaska (2002) estimates these costs to be about US$.10 per barrel.  On the other hand, it may be 
costly to allocate funds to the upfront margin payments required by the futures exchange.  Daniel 
(2001) estimates that the required margins associated with futures sales are 5-10 percent of the 
value of the contract, so the cost in terms of the assets that must be committed to these margin 
payments could be substantial.  Further, these payments can change significantly at short notice.  
Alaska (2002) estimates that a $5 per barrel rise in the oil price would have required it to increase 
its margin payment by US$950 million. Use of futures contracts by the Alberta government to 
reduce revenue volatility would require the government to commit a quantity of assets to margin 
payments and to have sufficient liquid assets available to cover changes in the margin requirement.  
                                                 
29 Using data for 1990-2001, Daniel (2001) compares a strategy that would involve selling oil each month at the 12-
month ahead futures price to a strategy that involves selling the same oil at the spot price when it is received in 12 
months.  He finds that the futures price is much less volatile than the spot price, but would also have resulted in a 
slightly lower average price over the sample.  Domanski and Heath (2007) also find that futures energy prices may be 
less volatile than spot prices, at least for futures contracts that are far enough in the future, generally at least 12 months. 
30 From 2004-2008, Alberta non-heavy oil sold in a range of 86 to 100 percent of the WTI price, while the range for 
heavy oil was 38 to 83 percent (www.energy.alberta.ca/1524.asp). 
31 It is possible to hedge royalty payments, other than those paid in-kind, using futures contracts since movements in the 
price of oil and total royalty revenues are highly correlated.  However, selling a quantity of futures contracts greater 
than the quantity of in-kind royalties would expose the province to a potentially large liability.  For example, suppose 
the province sold a greater number of petroleum futures contracts than the quantity of its in-kind royalty payments and 
the price of petroleum rose relative to the price stipulated in the futures contracts.  The province would then be 
responsible for making up the difference between the spot price and the contracted futures price without necessarily 
having a counterbalancing rise in its own revenues since energy prices and royalty revenues, although highly correlated, 
do not necessarily move one-for-one.  13 
 
5.3.2  Options markets 
 
Another shortcoming of futures markets as a method to smooth revenues is that, while 
futures contracts remove downside price risk, they also eliminate the potential benefit of an energy 
price increase.  Considerable public dissatisfaction is likely to ensue if revenues do not rise when 
energy prices rise.  For this reason, a jurisdiction may prefer to purchase put option contracts – 
contracts which provide insurance against price declines by essentially giving the holder of the 
contract the option, but not the obligation, to sell a commodity at a stated price if the price falls 
below this “strike price.”  With this type of option, a government obtains the benefit of a price rise, 
if commodity prices rise rather than fall, but is protected against a price fall.  Using data for 1990-
2000, Daniel (2001) simulated a put option strategy and found that it raised the mean return (by 
eliminating two large price falls) and reduced volatility. 
One of the benefits of options is that they do not restrict hedging to in-kind commodities 
only.  For example, given the very high correlation between royalty revenues and energy prices, the 
Alberta government could insure itself against a royalty decline by purchasing an option to sell oil 
at a fixed price (the strike price) for a fixed period of time.  If the price of oil fell, causing royalty 
payments to fall, the government would be able to counterbalance the fall in royalty revenues with 
the profits it would make by exercising the option (as long as the oil price fell below the strike 
price).  The purchase of the put options would insure the government against a fall in its royalty 
revenues to the extent that oil prices and royalty revenues are correlated. 
  A number of oil exporting jurisdictions – Ecuador, Mexico and Texas, for example – have 
used option contracts.  In 2008, with the price of oil over US$100, Mexico hedged all of its oil sales 
for 2009 through the purchase of put options with a strike price of US$70 (Blas, 2009).  In 
December 2009, Mexico announced that it had hedged 230 million barrels of oil, a large proportion 
of its 2010 oil production, at a strike price of $57.
32
 
  Despite the potential benefits of hedging, it is 
not common for energy exporting countries to hedge (Blas, 2009; Borensztein et al, 2009).  Texas 
implemented a hedging program from 1992 to 2000, but other states – Alaska, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma and Louisiana – have examined the costs and benefits of hedging and decided not to 
proceed in this direction. 
5.3.2.1  Problems associated with the use of options markets 
 
One reason jurisdictions have hesitated to use options markets to reduce the volatility of 
revenues may be political.  Frankel (2010), Caballero and Cowan (2007) and Daniel (2001) note 
that the political costs of hedging can outweigh the benefits.  In the case of a fall in the spot price, 
any financial gains from a hedging program may be seen as speculative returns.  Further, if a 
government had not hedged, it would be easy to blame the international oil market for any 
budgetary problems.  On the other hand, if the spot price remains above the strike price for the 
duration of the contract, the jurisdiction that purchased the put option would not reap an explicit 
benefit, but would still bear the cost of purchasing the option.  While this is a characteristic of every 
insurance contract, it may be difficult to explain to the public why the government committed 
significant resources to the purchase of options contracts that were worthless ex post (Caballero and 
                                                 




Another major consideration with the use of put options to insure against a revenue fall is 
that these options are generally expensive.  Using data for 2 March 2010, when the WTI spot price 
was US$80.53, a put option that expired in March 2011 with a strike price of US$80.5 would have 
cost $8.48 per barrel, making the cost of insuring $1 billion of oil approximately $105 million.
  In Ecuador, this situation led to allegations of “corruption” (Daniel, 2001).  The 
asymmetric nature of the political risk associated with the purchase of options may be one reason 
why politicians have been very hesitant to commit resources to options programs. 
34
To hedge all its oil sales in 2009, Mexico paid $1.5 billion for put options with a strike price 
of $70 when the spot price was over $100 (Blas, 2009).
  
Given this price, the purchaser of the option would not receive any net benefit unless the spot price 
fell below US$72.02.  Hedging with natural gas put options is even more expensive (most likely 
because the market is thinner).  The cost of insuring $1 billion of gas for a year, with an at-the-
money strike price was approximately US$165 million.  If the price of the commodity remains 
above the strike price, the premium would be lost and government expenditures would have 
increased by the cost of the option.  Swidler, Buttimer and Shaw (1999) show, using simulations, 
that the purchase of put options leads to more frequent deficits than without hedging because the 
cost of the options increases expenditures.  On the other hand, while deficits are more frequent, they 
are not as large as those that occur without hedging. 
35  In the end, Mexico netted $5 billion from 
this strategy (McCallion, 2009), but if prices had not fallen below $70, the Mexican government 
would have spent an extra $1.5 billion without an explicit payoff.  Simulations for the case of Texas 
in Swidler, Buttimer and Shaw (1999) show that the ex post net insurance premium paid by Texas 
was equal, on average, to about 2.6% of oil revenues.
36  Alaska (2002) estimates that a 3-year put 
option with a strike price $1 below the 3-year futures price would have cost US$3 per barrel, or 11 
percent of the spot price at the time (US$26).  Mexico’s 2010 hedge of 230 million barrels cost 
US$1.2 billion, a little over US$5 per barrel.  When the hedge was announced in late 2009, the 
strike price of $57 was approximately $20 less than spot and futures prices.
37
                                                 
33 A report by Alaska’s revenue department warned: “If a program succeeded, it is unlikely the policymakers who took 
the initiative to create the program would be rewarded with public congratulations . . . .  On the other hand, if the state 
lost significant sums ... the conventional wisdom is that public criticism would be harsh” (quoted in Blas, 2009). 
  In other words, 
Mexico paid US$5 per barrel to hedge for a relatively short period – a year – with a strike price far 
out-of-the-money.  Given these costs, there may be a tendency to use hedging strategies only if spot 
prices appear to be far out of line.  However, it is difficult to determine when prices are out of line 
and how long they will remain so, making this strategy speculative.        
34 The purchase of the same quantity of contracts with a strike price of $78.50, $2 below the spot price, would have cost 
US$95 million.  These calculations are based on NYMEX prior settlement prices as there were no actual trades.  
35 The strike price of $70 was far below the spot price at the time, which was over $100.  A minimum estimate of the 
per barrel cost of this hedge is $1.60.  This estimate assumes Mexico was producing 2.5 million barrels per day, and that 
the options covered Mexico’s entire production for the year.   
36 Lower spot prices appear to be associated with much lower put option prices.  Verleger (1993) gives the cost of 
Mexico’s 1990-91 purchase of put options with a strike price of $17 as approximately $.40 per barrel when spot prices 
were approximately $30.  Lu and Neftci (2008) provide lower cost estimates for hedging using simulations (rather than 
actual market prices).  They find that the cost of an at-the-money put option on oil was 4.1 percent for a 1-year contract 
and 4.8 percent for three years.  A 20 percent out of the money option on oil would cost .3 percent for 1-year and 1 
percent for 3-years. That is, buying a three-year 20 percent out-of-the-money option for insuring an underlying portfolio 
of $US 500 million of oil would cost $5 million.  
37 This strike price is not that far below the US$61.69 WTI average price for 2009.  It may have been less speculative to 
sell futures contracts for US$77, the reigning futures price in December 2009, but this would have eliminated the up-
side potential.  15 
 
The cost of a put option depends on the time to expiration of the contract (shorter are 
cheaper), the extent to which the option is out-of-the-money (more out-of-the-money are cheaper) 
and the volatility of the price of the underlying commodity (less volatile are cheaper).  One way to 
reduce the cost of the hedge is to purchase a shorter maturity option or one with a lower strike price.  
A three month at-the-money put option is about half the price of a one-year option, while a one year 
option that is 2.5 percent out-of-the-money is about 10 percent cheaper than an at-the-money 
option.
38
Another method of reducing the upfront cost of hedging is to sell an option to buy oil at a 
specific price (a call option) at the same time as the option to sell (the put option) is purchased 
(creating a no cost collar).  The premium received for the option to buy would offset the premium 
paid for the option to sell.  The problem with this procedure is that it puts an upper bound on the 
earnings from a price increase, and so eliminates some of the upside potential.  Further, while it is 
costly, but riskless, to purchase any quantity of options to sell oil, selling call options (options to 
buy) in quantities that are greater than the quantity of in-kind oil royalty payments is risky.  If the 
price of oil rises above the strike price, the government would be liable for a payment to the holders 
of the call options equal to the difference between the spot price and the strike price.  If royalty 
payments have not also risen one-for-one with the price of oil, the obligation associated with the 
call option would exceed the royalty revenue increase, implying a net cost.  Finally, unlike the 
purchase of a put option, the sale of a call would require the commitment of government resources 
to a margin payment.   
  Of course, the level of insurance provided by the option would then be lower.   
There are several other shortcomings with the use of options as a method of smoothing 
revenues, most of which are similar to the shortcomings of futures contracts.  Put options will only 
insure against a fall in prices during the length of the contract.  Contract lengths are not indefinite, 
so full insurance cannot be obtained.  Nevertheless, hedging may provide the government with time 
during which to plan adjustment.  The purchase of longer contracts is likely to be more expensive as 
most of the liquidity in the options market is at very short horizons.  Borensztein et al (2009) note 
that on NYMEX most hedging is for maturities of less than three months and the risk premium 
becomes very large for longer maturities.
39  It is possible to buy longer term options in the over-the-
counter market, but these contracts are illiquid and involve greater counterparty risk than options 
traded on an exchange.  If a government follows a hedging program, particularly one using over-
the-counter instruments, the government must possess sufficient expertise to run the hedging 
program, understand the risks and monitor the activities of the hedging unit.
40
 
  Hedging operations 
are often quite complex and Daniel (2001) argues that, without adequate institutional capacity, the 




                                                 
38 These comparisons use NYMEX data from 2 March 2010. 
39 It has been suggested that short term contracts can simply be rolled over to facilitate longer maturity hedging 
(Verleger, 1993; Borensztein et al, 2009), but there is some debate about the risk associated with this procedure (Powell, 
1989; Larson and Varangis, 1996). 
40 As noted by Larson and Varangis (1996), the “cases of Codelco (a copper producer in Chile), MG Corp. (a unit of 
Germany's Metallgesellschaft AG), Procter and Gamble Co., Orange County in California, Sumitomo, and Barings 
Bank have shown that the lack of internal controls and systems to monitor the exposure from using derivative markets 
can result in very serious losses.” 16 
 
5.4  Revenue Volatility with a Savings Fund  
 
The analysis above has made clear that revenue volatility in Alberta is driven by royalty 
volatility.  On average over the 1981-2007 period, the magnitude and volatility of real per capita 
own-source revenues excluding royalties have been similar in Alberta, Saskatchewan, British 
Columbia and Ontario.  In the past, Alberta governments have created “saving,” “stabilization” and 
“endowment” funds.  However, the objective of these funds has not been the reduction of revenue 
volatility per se and, in addition, there has been considerable discretion involved in the allocation of 
revenue into and out of these funds (Busby, 2008). 
It is straightforward to show that a savings fund could greatly reduce government revenue 
volatility.  One form of this type of fund would, during each year, involve the commitment of a 
certain type or percentage of current revenues to the fund along with the withdrawal of a fixed 
percentage of the total assets or long term earnings from the fund (or both).  This type of savings 
fund would reduce revenue volatility because the revenue paid out by the fund in a particular year 
would be based on average contributions from previous years.  The ability of a savings fund to 
reduce volatility would be greater if most or all of the most volatile components of revenues (i.e. 
royalties) were deposited in the fund each year, leaving only the less volatile components of 
revenues, as well as withdrawals from the fund, to finance current spending.  A savings fund would 
also reduce revenue uncertainty as current and future revenues would depend on past contributions 
to the fund.  The government would, therefore, have more information on the future path of this 
component of revenues, and could use this information to plan expenditures.   
Using data on actual revenues over the past 30 years, a simple example shows the extent to 
which revenue smoothing with a savings fund can reduce revenue volatility.
41  Suppose the 
Government of Alberta had committed 75 percent of royalty revenues to a savings fund from which 
each year it withdrew the real earnings of the fund (based on the average real interest rate over the 
previous 20 years) plus 5 percent of the total assets in the fund.
42
The specific example described above shows how a savings fund could significantly reduce 
  Since real interest rates vary 
considerably, greater smoothing is achieved with the use of the long term average return.  Under 
this scheme, average per capita own-source revenues available to the government (that is net of 
contributions to and withdrawals from the savings fund) would have been only 4.5 percent lower 
than actual average real per capita own-source revenues for the 1981-2007 period.  Further, real per 
capita own-source revenues, net of contributions to and withdrawals from the savings fund, would 
have still been 25 percent higher than the average for Saskatchewan, British Columbia and Ontario.  
In addition, the total assets in the fund would have been close to $75 billion by 2007 and the 
coefficient of variation of own-source revenues (net of contributions and withdrawals from the 
fund) would have fallen from 15.4 to just under 6, a decline in the volatility of own-source revenues 
of over 60 percent.  As shown in Table 7, this coefficient of variation would have been lower than 
the coefficients of variation of British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Ontario.  Given this significant 
decline in revenue volatility, and the considerable costs associated with the rapid expansion and 
contraction of government programs, the budget revenue stabilization benefits of the fund could 
easily outweigh the 4.5 percent fall in available real per capita own-source revenues even without 
considering the $75 billion that would have been accumulated in the fund by 2007.    
                                                 
41 This example is intended for the purposes of illustration and does not adjust for the savings that were actually 
undertaken by the Alberta government during the sample period, such as saving through the Alberta Heritage Trust 
Fund. 
42 Frankel (2010) discusses funds with a similar cap on withdrawals. 17 
 
the volatility of revenues.  It does this in three ways.  First, the most volatile component of 
revenues, royalties, are deposited in the fund.  Second, through the use of a long-term average real 
interest rate (since returns vary considerably from year-to-year).  Third, withdrawals each year are a 
constant fraction of the fund’s stock of assets.  This type of fund is not a stabilization fund or a 
“rainy day” fund, as extra funds are not withdrawn when there is a negative disturbance to revenues.  
It is a savings fund that can smooth revenues by weakening the link between current royalties and 
current budgetary revenues. A major advantage of a savings fund over a stabilization fund is that it 
does not require the government to identify the conditions under which contributions and 
withdrawals should be made.  In addition, a savings fund may facilitate a process whereby 
government takes a long-term view of budgeting.  Finally, the fund could be designed to be 
transparent and easily understood by the public.   
  The principal problem with the creation of a savings fund of this type is that, as the fund 
grows in size, pressure may mount for taxes to be cut or the proportion of assets withdrawn from the 
fund to be increased, particularly in times when revenues from other sources have fallen.  As a 






6.  Conclusion 
 
Volatile revenues may lead to the inefficient provision of government services, stop-go pro-
cyclical fiscal policies and, potentially, slower growth.  Alberta’s revenues are volatile relative to 
those of other provinces.  This volatility is associated principally with the volatility of energy sector 
royalties.  Own-source revenues less royalties are no more volatile than the corresponding revenues 
of other provinces.  Further, the magnitude of Alberta’s non-royalty own-source revenues are of 
similar size to those of other provinces. 
The principal problem with revenue volatility is that it usually leads to volatile government 
expenditures.  Revenue volatility would be much less of a problem if governments could maintain 
stable spending during revenue booms and busts.  However, it is difficult to forecast the extent to 
which revenues are permanent when they depend heavily on energy price movements, and this 
makes it difficult to choose the correct balanced path for expenditures.  History also shows that, 
across numerous countries and time periods, it is politically very difficult to control spending during 
revenue expansions, even if these are likely to be temporary. 
  Given the large contribution of the volatile royalty component to total government 
revenues, there are few practical methods available to stabilize revenues.  The hedging of royalty 
revenues using futures and options markets is costly, cannot remove all volatility or uncertainty and, 
given the experience of other jurisdictions, may have significant political risk. 
                                                 
43 Another budgeting method that has been used to reduce the risk of a revenue shortfall and the need to cut 
expenditures is to under estimate revenues.  Tying expenditures to a downward-biased revenue forecast would not 
change the degree of revenue volatility, but would provide a buffer against an unexpected fall in revenue.  This type of 
policy could also be used as a backdoor method of creating a “rainy day” fund, if the “unexpected” surpluses are saved, 
but it is likely to be difficult to create a sizable fund in this way.  A policy of this type also has two other shortcomings.  
First, the ex post budget surpluses that result on average can be easily identified and may induce demands for increased 
spending.  Second, this type of policy will quickly make budget forecasts non-credible and could lead to a political 
backlash and calls for tax reductions, which would defeat the purpose of the buffer. 18 
 
On average, although not in every sub-period, movements in the exchange rate have tended 
to reduce the volatility of own-source revenues.  While this smoothing effect has likely been 
increased by the Bank of Canada’s policy of inflation targeting, exchange rate movements still act 
as only a partial hedge against energy price movements. 
  Tax base diversification, through the introduction of a sales tax for example, is likely to 
have only a minor effect on revenue volatility.  This follows because the more stable alternative tax 
bases have already been fully exploited or the maximum revenues that could be obtained from these 
tax bases are not likely to be large enough to have an appreciable effect on overall revenue 
volatility.  The only way tax base diversification could have a large impact on revenue volatility is 
if there is a significant relative increase in taxes on non-energy-related tax bases, but this would 
imply a rise in the overall tax burden or a very large decrease in the revenues collected from 
royalties and corporate taxes.    
The most promising approach to address revenue volatility is the creation of a savings fund 
into which the most volatile components of revenues are deposited.  If withdrawals from the fund 
are a fixed proportion of the fund’s total assets and are tied to the long-term earnings of the fund, 
there is a considerable reduction in the volatility of government budgetary revenues (net of 
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All government revenue data are from the Statistics Canada Cansim database, tables 3840004, 




Data are converted to per capita terms using Statistics Canada population estimates for Alberta 
(V469503), British Columbia (V469818), Saskatchewan (V469188) and Ontario (V468558). 
 
Values are converted to real terms using Statistics Canada price indices for net government current 
expenditure on goods and services - Alberta (V3840832), British Columbia (V3840036), 
Saskatchewan (V3840803) and Ontario (V3840745). 
 
Tax base data for Alberta are in current dollars and are from the Statistics Canada Cansim database: 
  Wages and salaries and supplementary labour income (V687289), 
  Corporation profits before taxes (V687290), 
  Interest and miscellaneous investment income (V687291), 
  Personal expenditures on consumer goods (V687648), 
  Final domestic demand (V687680), 
  Personal income (V691711). 
 
Average annual exchange rate data (Canadian dollars per US dollar) are from the International 
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics database (identifier: 156..RF.ZF…). 
  
The West Texas Intermediate (WTI) petroleum price in US dollars is the period average from the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics database (identifier: 
11176AAZZFM17). 
 
The Alberta natural gas price data were downloaded from the website of the Canadian Association 
of Petroleum Producers on 10 February 2010 
(http://www.capp.ca/LIBRARY/STATISTICS/Pages/default.aspx#4luXUn7UFh0k).  These are 
annual averages in Canadian dollars. 
 
Data on disaggregated natural resource revenues are from various issues of the Annual Report of the 





                                                 
44 We chose to use Provincial Economic Accounts data, rather than Statistics Canada’s FMS data because the Provincial 
Economic Accounts begin in 1981, rather than 1988, and disaggregate royalty revenues from interest and other 
investment income revenues, which the FMS data do not do.  
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Table 1:  Average Real Per Capita Revenue and Volatility, 1981-2007 
 
                           British   
                    Alberta        Saskatchewan       Columbia           Ontario 
Real per capita revenue: 
 
Total revenue          8063    7327    6772    5508 
 
Own-source revenue        7105    5639    5810    4707 
 Percentage share of total revenue    88.1    77.0    85.8    85.5 
 
Own-source revenue minus royalties    4899    4817    5211    4684 
 Percentage share of total revenue    60.8    65.7    76.9    85.0 
 
 
Coefficients of variation:* 
 
Total revenue          13.4    6.5    6.3    5.0 
Own-source revenue        15.4    6.5    7.8    6.2 




*The coefficient of variation is the ratio (multiplied by 100) of the standard deviation of the differences from an 
exponential trend to the average value of the series.   
 




Table 2:  Volatility of Government Revenues and Selected Tax Bases in Alberta, 1981-2007 
                         
                       Coefficient of Variation* 
Real Per Capita Government Revenues: 
 
Total revenues                13.4 
Own-source revenues                                                                           15.4 
Own-source revenues minus royalties              6.7 
 
Royalties                                                                          43.6 
Direct taxes corporations                                                                          24.2 
Interest and other investment income                                                          14.9 
Direct taxes persons                                                                          10.2 
 
Retail sales tax**                                                                          12.0 
Gaming profits**                                                                           6.3 
Gasoline tax**                                                                           3.2 
 
 
Real Per Capita Tax Base Variables: 
 
Corporation profits before taxes           36.0 
Interest and miscellaneous investment income        21.4 
Final demand                  8.3 
Wages, salaries and supplementary labour income        8.2 
Personal income                4.8 
Expenditure on consumer goods             2.7 
 
 
Real Energy Prices: 
 
West Texas Intermediate petroleum price, $US                                           46.9 
West Texas Intermediate petroleum price, $CAN                                        39.4 
Natural gas price, $US                                                                           46.3 
Natural gas price, $CAN                                                                           42.0 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*The coefficient of variation is the ratio (multiplied by 100) of the standard deviation of the differences from an 
exponential trend to the average value of the series.   
 
** Sample period is 1994-2007.  This shorter sample is employed because the use of these taxes changed considerably 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada data.  See the Data Appendix for more information. 
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Table 3:  Correlation Coefficient between the Percentage Change in Total Own-Source 
                Revenue and the Percentage Change in the Variable Indicated, 1982-2007 
 
                           British 
                    Alberta       Saskatchewan      Columbia           Ontario 
 
Own-source revenue minus royalties    .75    .86    .92    1.0 
Royalties          .90    .67    .59    .23   
Direct taxes corporations      .71    .33    .46    .83   
Direct taxes persons        .42    .20    .66    .74   
Retail sales tax            -    .53    .49    .75 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
   




Table 4:  Selected Revenue Types – Average Share of Real Per Capita Own-Source 
                Revenues, 1981-2007 (percent) 
 
                           British 
                    Alberta       Saskatchewan      Columbia           Ontario 
 
Royalties          31.1    14.6    10.3      0.5   
Direct taxes persons        20.5    22.6    24.7    33.2   
Retail sales tax*          2.0    16.0    18.0    22.6 
Direct taxes corporations        8.3      4.4      4.9      8.8   
Interest and other investment income    15.7    12.4      9.1      4.8   
Contributions to social insurance and other    7.5      4.9    11.3    10.2   
     transfers from persons   
____________________________________________________________________________________   
 
* Includes alcohol and tobacco taxes. 
   




Table 5:  Alberta Real Per Capita Natural Resource Revenues by Type (2002 dollars) 
 
                       Bonuses          Synthetic               Total 
                Natural                For Sale           Crude                Non- 
                 Gas              Crude                of               Oil            Renewable 
 Fiscal                and By-              Oil              Crown               and             Resource 
 Year_               Products            Royalties*         Leases              Bitumen             Revenue 
 
1981-82    1768    1970    503    208    4669 
1982-83    1453    1815    261    281    4005 
1983-84    1210    2059    348    217    4029 
1984-85    1359    2137    463      na*    4203 
1985-86    1235    1888    495      na*    3841 
1986-87      718      665    191      na*    1585 
1987-88      638      858    480      na*    1970 
1988-89      600      581    273      na*    1554 
1989-90      548      642    222      16    1522 
1990-91      576      707    222      21    1630 
1991-92      420      520    131      16    1192 
1992-93      513      485      80      31    1204 
1993-94      651      354    331      30    1463 
1994-95      562      491    437      93    1688 
1995-96      444      466    255    138    1410 
1996-97      559      596    399    220    1890 
1997-98      680      368    439      79    1559 
1998-99      581      178    184      23      931 
1999-00      927      419    282    162    1777 
2000-01    2583      538    416    255    3797 
2001-02    1376      337    331      63    2126 
2002-03    1638      376    181      58    2279 
2003-04    1665      300    295      60    2346 
2004-05    1875      371    365    209    2838 
2005-06    2289      399    952    259    3915 
2006-07    1525      356    627    614    3122 
2007-08    1247      397    270    699    2644 
2008-09    1303      402    248    664    2661 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source:  Revenues are from various issues of the Annual Report, Department of Energy, Government of Alberta.  Data 
for population and the price index are from Statistics Canada as described in the Data Appendix.   These population and 
price data are annual, so data for the calendar year in which the fiscal year begins are employed. 
 




Table 6:  Correlation Coefficients between Percentage Changes, 1982-2007 
                     
                                WTI 
                          Natural         petroleum   
                        Royalties      gas price ($C)       price ($C) 
Real per capita Alberta government revenues: 
 
Total revenues              .90    .71    .73 
Own-source revenues                 .90   .68                     .72 
Own-source revenues minus royalties          .42    .13    .53 
Direct taxes persons            .13              -.08    .28 
Interest and other investment income          .26                      .28                    .19 
Direct taxes corporations          .57    .28    .68 
Royalties               --    .87    .70 
 
 
Real per capita tax base variables, Alberta: 
 
Wages, salaries and supplementary labour income    .23    .24    .22 
Personal income            .20    .14    .20 
Expenditure on consumer goods         .16    .07    .25 
Final demand              .31    .27    .30 
Interest and miscellaneous investment income      .95    .81    .73 






Exchange rate (Canadian dollars per US dollar)      -.13    -.06    -.31 
Natural gas price, $US             .86     .98     .52 
Natural gas price, $C              .87       --     .49 
West Texas Intermediate petroleum price, $US           .66          .46                    .98 
West Texas Intermediate petroleum price, $C           .70                      .49                      -- 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 




Table 7:  Coefficients of Variation for Selected Revenue Types, 1981-2007* 
 
                           British 
                    Alberta        Saskatchewan       Columbia           Ontario 
 
Total own-source revenue      15.4      6.5      7.8      6.2 
Direct taxes persons        10.2    11.4    13.8      8.1 
Direct taxes corporations      24.2    23.6    18.6    23.1 
Interest and other investment income    14.8    18.3    29.9      8.9 
Retail sales tax            −       9.5      5.4      8.8 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*The coefficient of variation is the ratio (multiplied by 100) of the standard deviation of the differences from an 
exponential trend to the average value of the series.   
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